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Living Apart Together: EU Comprehensive
Security from a Trade Perspective
Fabienne BOSSUYT, Lotte DRIEGHE &
Jan ORBIE*
In contributing to the debate on the European Union (EU)’s comprehensive approach to security,
this article examines the structural-operational interface between trade and security. It
hypothesizes that the challenge of comprehensive security to combine structural activities with
operational measures is most pronounced in the trade-security interface. As the oldest, most
integrated and most powerful external policy domain of the EU, trade policy has acquired a high
degree of institutional autonomy, operates according to its own logic and standard procedures and
has a distinct organizational esprit de corps. This inhibits the integration of the EU’s trade
policy into the more comprehensive security portfolio.
To operationalize this hypothesis, the article empirically explores the coherence between EU
trade and security discourses and the extent to which trade measures have been used for security
policy ends, as envisaged in the 2003 European Security Strategy. The empirical analysis
confirms the hypothesis that coherence between the trade and security areas is limited, and that
this relates to the institutional insulation of the EU trade policy sphere. However, the findings
reveal that external factors, such as international trade law and preferences of the trade partners,
should also be considered to further explain the relatively limited coherence between EU trade
and security.
1 INTRODUCTION
In contributing to the debate on the European Union (EU)’s comprehensive
approach to security, this article examines the interface between trade and security.
More specifically, it explores the coherence between EU trade and security
discourses and the extent to which trade measures have been used for security
policy ends, as envisaged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which
states that trade policy should ‘follow the same agenda’ as the EU’s security
policy.1 As conceptualized by Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, the trade-security
nexus is one of the three ‘structural-operational interfaces’ in the EU’s
comprehensive approach towards security, alongside the security-development
* Fabienne Bossuyt, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Ghent University. Lotte
Drieghe, Affiliated Researcher at the Department of Political Science, Ghent University. Jan Orbie,
Professor at the Department of Political Science, Ghent University.
1 European Council,European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a BetterWorld 3 (12 Dec. 2003).
Bossuyt, Fabienne; Drieghe, Lotte & Orbie, Jan. ‘Living ApartTogether: EU Comprehensive Security from
aTrade Perspective’. European Foreign Affairs Review 18, Special Issue (2013): 63–82.
© 2013 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands
nexus (see Merket in this issue) and the foreign policy-security nexus (see Smith
in this issue).2 Several authors have pointed out that in the interface between the
structural and the operational, the EU stands out from other organizations and
their approach to comprehensive security because of the broad set of military,
political and economic tools that the EU can use for security-related purposes.3 At
the same time, the exceptional nature of the EU, and in particular, its institutional
design, poses limits to the way and extent to which structural measures can be
combined with operational instruments, most notably due to the pillar divide that
has long separated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) from
Community activities, and which de facto continues to exist despite the formal
depillarization introduced under the Lisbon Treaty.4 The pursuit and
implementation of a comprehensive security agenda requires the coordination of a
large number of institutional actors and policies across bureaucratic, organizational
and functional boundaries. However, the complex multi-level structure and
compartmentalized nature of the EU’s external policy framework poses an
intricate challenge for this kind of coordination. It is not a coincidence, therefore,
that recent efforts at strengthening the EU’s capacity to act as a single actor
externally are mostly concerned with the enhancement of institutional coherence.
Paradoxically, as Van Elsuwege points out, ‘the new Treaty provisions do not solve
the complex dichotomy between CFSP and non-CFSP actions and even increase
the potential for inter-institutional conflicts’.5
Importantly, there is also an ideational aspect to the institutional
fragmentation. For comprehensive security to be provided at the interface between
the structural and the operational, the two sides should be connected and should
be considered by the policy-makers and practitioners involved as two tasks
subscribing to the same functional aim. In reality, however, the extent to which the
structural and operational sides align their positions to a common goal is
constrained by the tension that emerges from two competing logics of interaction,
i.e., the logic of intergovernmental cooperation and the integrationist logic
respectively, which each follow a different finalité.6 The fact that the two sides are
driven by different interests and objectives, and that they each follow their own
2 C. Gebhard & P. Norheim-Martinsen, Making sense of EU comprehensive security towards conceptual and
analytical clarity, 20 European Security 2, 232 (2011).
3 Ibid., 222 and 231; E. Gross, EU and the comprehensive approach, DIIS Report 13, 9−10 (Danish Inst.
Int’l Stud. 2008); S. Biscop &V.Arnould, Global public goods: an integrative agenda for EU external action,
in Effective multilateralism: Europe, regional security and a revitalised UN 22−31 (E.B. Eide ed., Foreign
Policy Centre 2004).
4 Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, supra n. 2, at 222; Gross, supra n. 3, at 9−10; P.Van Elsuwege, EU
External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance between Delimitation and
Consistency, 47 CML Rev. 4, 987−1019 (2010).
5 Van Elsuwege, supra n. 4, at 988.
6 Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, supra n. 2, at 232.
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logic and standards of procedures makes it difficult for institutional actors (e.g.,
DG Trade v. European External Action Service) and political leaders (e.g., trade
ministers v. defence ministers) to agree on the priorities to achieve common goals.
This does not only hold true for efforts at inter-pillar coordination but also for
intra-pillar activities, as shown for instance by Pilegaard’s historical-institutionalist
study of the trade-development nexus.7
Based on the insights provided above, this article hypothesizes that the
challenge of comprehensive security to combine structural activities with
operational measures is most pronounced in the trade-security interface. As the
oldest, most integrated and most powerful external policy domain of the EU, trade
policy has acquired a high degree of institutional autonomy, operates according to
its own logic and standard procedures and has a distinct organizational esprit de
corps. This inhibits the integration of the EU’s trade policy into the more
comprehensive security portfolio. In operationalizing this hypothesis we examine
the extent to which trade measures have been used for security policy ends by
focusing on the politico-strategic level of the EU system (as compared to the
operational and the tactical level, see introduction article of this special issue). At
the politico-strategic level, security comprehensiveness is primarily a matter of
horizontal coherence,8 i.e., coherence between the different dimensions of the
EU’s external action. In the scholarly literature, ‘coherence’ is generally
conceptualized as denoting both the absence of contradictions between different
areas of external policy and the establishment of a synergy between them.9 In
policy terms, ‘coherence’ thus refers to the duty of ensuring synergy between the
different fields of the EU’s external action; it implies (a matter of quality of)
interaction between different organizational entities.10 From this perspective, the
article is thus concerned with horizontal coherence between the EU’s trade and
security policies, from the angle of EU trade activities.Accordingly, we hypothesize
that coherence between the two policy areas is limited to the extent that
synergetic interaction between the two realms is difficult or even absent.
The article is structured as follows. First, we further set out the
theoretical-analytical contours of the article, and operationalize the central
hypothesis by drawing on the extant literature on the concept of coherence. In the
second section, we analyse the trade and security strategies to assess the coherence
between the two policy areas at the discursive level. Next, we explore the main
7 J. Pilegaard, An institutionalist perspective of EU trade and development policies in the context of the EPA
negotiations, in Beyond Market Access for Development: EU–Africa Relations inTransition 263−276 (G. Faber
& J. Orbie eds., Routledge 2007).
8 Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, supra n. 2, at 236.
9 P. Gauttier, Horizontal coherence and the external competencies of the European Union, 10 European L. J. 1,
23, 26 (2004); C. Gebhard, Coherence, in International Relations and the European Union 106 (C. Hill &
M. Smith eds., Oxford U. Press 2011);Van Elsuwege, supra n. 4, at 1013−1014.
10 Gebhard, supra n. 9, at 106
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topics and activities on the EU trade agenda of the last decade, including the
negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African partner
countries, the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the new
generation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with partner countries in Asia, in
order to examine the extent to which trade instruments have been used for the
purpose of foreign and security policy objectives. Methodologically, the
examination is based on a triangulation of document analysis, a literature review
and interviews. The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that coherence
between the trade and security areas is limited, and that this relates to the
institutional insulation of the EU trade policy sphere. However, as will be
highlighted in the concluding section, the findings reveal that external factors, such
as international trade law and preferences of the trade partners, should also be
considered.To further explain the relatively limited coherence between EU trade
and security one must move beyond the internal-institutional setting of the EU.
2 THEORETICAL-ANALYTICAL CONTOURS: THREE FACES OF
COHERENCE
Nuttall identifies three different interpretations – or faces – of coherence; apart
from being ‘benign’, coherence can also be ‘neutral’ or even ‘malign’.11 The neutral
interpretation refers to the absence of contradiction between policies. ‘Benign
coherence’, in turn, points to a desirable, positive way of interaction between two
policy areas and their respective bureaucracies, bound to the ‘service of a common
purpose’. ‘Malign coherence’, by contrast, relates to conflicts arising in the case of
competing policy objectives, pillarized bureaucratic cultures and the struggle for
institutional power, so-called ‘turf battling’ between rivalrous institutions.12
Following Nuttall’s typology and analytical distinction, we expect that
horizontal coherence between the EU trade and security spheres will be neutral at
best. Put differently, if there is coherence in the trade-security nexus, it will consist
merely of an absence of contradictions between the two areas rather than of the
establishment of a synergy between them and an alignment around the same goals.
We assume that this is due to the institutional compartmentalization and the
cross-pillar divide of the EU system of external policy, with DG Trade being a
highly autonomous sub-system.The powerful position that the EU’s trade policy
machinery has acquired in the EU’s institutional architecture means that it acts
fairly independently from the other DGs, and that its activities cannot easily be
11 S. Nuttall, Coherence and consistency, in International Relations and the European Union 96−97 (C. Hill &
M. Smith eds., Oxford U. Press 2005).
12 Ibid., 96−97; Gebhard, supra n. 10, at 111−112.
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influenced by other parts of the EU’s external relations policy structure, including
the CFSP.
Moreover, we assume that this continues to be the case in the post-Lisbon
context. Even if it could be argued that the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the
political dimension of EU trade policy, e.g., by stating that ‘[t]he common
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and
objectives of the Union’s external action’ (Article 207(1) TFEU)13, and even if it
was one of the major ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty to reduce the institutional
compartmentalization inhibiting coherence, the institutional autonomy of DG
Trade has been kept virtually intact, with trade being left outside of the new
institutional configurations of the EU’s external action portfolio. DG Trade does
not fall under the competence of the newly established EEAS and the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – the two key
institutional innovations aimed at fostering increased coherence. Under the Treaty,
for instance, the High Representative chairs the meetings of the Foreign Affairs
Council, except when it is dealing with commercial policy issues, in which case
the rotating Presidency takes over the chair. This suggests that the institutional
walls between the trade and the security domains are likely to remain high even
after the LisbonTreaty.
In addition, we hypothesize that the inhibiting impact of this institutional
fragmentation is reinforced by an ideational element, since the trade and the
security sub-systems each operate according to their own logic and standard
procedures and have an opposing organizational esprit de corps (see supra). Indeed,
the institutional tensions that behold the trade-security nexus, and the nexus
between trade and foreign policy in general, reflect the basic tension that exists
between the views of trade purists (including trade policy-makers) and foreign
policy specialists (including diplomats). ‘For purists, EU foreign policy objectives
intrude, as they should not, on trade policy, which should be used narrowly to
defend European economic interests.’14 EU trade policy-makers seem to assume
that trade is too blunt an instrument to address complex foreign policy and
security issues, and that it may even be counterproductive when used for other
purposes. Foreign policy experts, by contrast, consider trade as a policy tool
through which the EU conducts a ‘structural’ foreign policy, ‘which seeks to shape
the structure of international society – and allows the Union to act as a ‘civilian
power’, which uses non-military, mostly economic power in pursuit of its foreign
13 See e.g., F. Hoffmeister, The European Union’s common commercial policy a year after Lisbon – Sea change or
business as usual?’, in The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon, CLEER Working
Papers 3 (P. Koutrakos ed., 2011).
14 J. Peterson, EUTrade Policy as Foreign Policy: Does Strategy plus Activity = Strategic Action? Paper presented
at the Biennial EUSA Conference, Montreal, 17−19 May (2007).
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policy objectives’.15All this points to the historically grown institutional
fragmentation between the supranational logic of (former) first pillar areas and the
intergovernmental logic of (former) second pillar areas. Since trade and security
policy represent the most ideal typical cases of both logics – trade being an
exclusive competence with large discretion for the Commission, security being of
an intergovernmental nature without much involvement of the European
Commission – we expect coherence between them to be limited.
In what follows, we will examine these assumptions and expectations using
the above introduced typologies and analytical distinctions. In assessing the extent
to which trade measures have served to pursue security policy objectives, we start
with an analysis of the EU’s discourse on trade and security. By considering both
the ESS16 as formulated in 2003 and revised in 200817 and the EU’s external
trade strategies of 200618 and 201019, the coherence at the discursive level
between both areas is examined. Next, we go beyond the discourse to explore the
extent to which actual trade instruments have been used in pursuit of foreign and
security policy goals.
3 COHERENCE BETWEEN THE EU TRADE AND SECURITY
STRATEGIES
When exploring EU trade and security strategies, some striking similarities
emerge at the discursive level. At first sight, the strategies pertaining to these two
dimensions of Europe’s international role seem surprisingly coherent.While the
ESS sketches an ambitious agenda and approach that goes far beyond a narrow
definition of security, the EU’s trade discourse suggests that trade relations are no
longer just concerned with economic objectives and embraces an equally broad
approach.20 Both the trade and security strategies envisage a comprehensive set of
objectives whereby short-term ‘possession goals’ are combined with long-term
‘milieu goals’.21 They also share a preference for multilateralism combined with
attempts to externalize the European model of regional integration.
15 Ibid.
16 European Council, supra n. 1.
17 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a
ChangingWorld (11 Dec. 2008).
18 European Commission,Global Europe: Competing in theWorld: a Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs
Strategy, COM (2006) 567 final.
19 European Commission,Trade, Growth andWorld Affairs, COM (2010) 61 final.
20 European Council, supra n. 1; European Council, supra n. 16.
21 K.E. Smith,EU foreign policy in a changing world (Polity 2003).
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The EU’s enhanced security capabilities have been considered as part of its
‘civilian power’ role22 The broad ambitions and instruments of the ESS, and its
focus on non-traditional aspects of security such as ‘human security’, are widely
illustrated in the literature.23 In a similar vein, since the late 1990s, trade is not
considered as a goal in itself, but rather as a tool in the EU’s civilian or normative
power agenda. The trade instruments are presented as crucial devices to ‘harness
globalization’.24
More generally, both the trade and security discourses seem embedded in the
EU’s self-conception as a ‘normative power’ in the world.25 Interestingly, the
Lisbon Treaty seems to further strengthen the coherence between the EU’s trade
and foreign and security policy goals along the lines of a Civilian/Normatic Power
EuropeTrade Normative Power Europe role.
However, the question is whether growing coherence between these aims and
approaches also means that the trade and security realms have become more
integrated, and thus, that the trade-security nexus goes beyond a mere absence of
contradictions (cf. neutral coherence) to include objectives of creating positive
interactions or synergies around a common purpose (cf. benign coherence). In
order to examine this, we investigate whether the respective discourses include any
direct cross-references.
Starting with the discourse of the security domain, both the ESS of 2003 and
the Report on the Implementation of the ESS of 2008 include a number of direct
cross-references to trade. However, most of these linkages are rather vague.26
‘Trade’ is mentioned as part of a long list of instruments and objectives: ‘the full
spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our
disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and
development activities’ and ‘each situation requires coherent use of our
instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis
response, economic and trade cooperation’.27 The strategy also contains a more
22 H. Larsen,The EU:A Global Military Actor? 37 Cooperation & Conflict 3, 283–302 (2002); S. Stavridis,
‘Militarising’ the EU:The concept of civilian power Europe revisited, 36 Int’l Spectator 4, 43−50 (2001).
23 European Council, supra n. 1; European Council, supra n. 16; S. Biscop, The European security strategy
(Ashgate 2005); M. Kaldor, M. Martin & S. Selchow Human security:A new strategic narrative for Europe,
83 Int’l Affairs 2, 273−288 (2007).
24 A.Van den Hoven, Assuming Leadership in Multilateral Economic Institutions, 27West European Politics 2,
256−83 (2004); S. Meunier, Trading Voices:The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations
(Princeton U. Press 2007); J. Orbie,Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the EU (Ashgate 2008).
25 Compare I. Manners, Normative Power Europe:A contradiction in terms?, 40 J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 2, 235−58
(2002). For more on this argument, see J. Orbie, L. Drieghe & F. Bossuyt, EU trade policy and the
European Security Strategy: Speaking the same language in different worlds, 65 Studia Diplomatica 3, 3−24
(2012).
26 European Council, supra n. 1; European Council, supra n. 16;This is even more so in the case of the
ESS 2008 compared with the ESS 2003.
27 European Council, supra n. 1, at 11; European Council, supra n. 16, at 9.
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explicit reference to coherence between security and trade, formulated in military
language: ‘Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies
should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of
command.’28 Moreover, the ESS considers trade (and development) policies as
‘powerful tools for promoting reform’ in developing countries, in particular
through encouraging good governance and respect for human rights.29 In
addition, the ESS raises the importance of external trade policy in pursuing
effective multilateralism, with the WTO being highlighted as a ‘key institution in
the international system’, in which the EU has ‘an interest in further
developing’.30 The completion of the Doha Development Round is emphasized as
a key priority.31
There is, however, no specific elaboration in the security strategy on how
trade could contribute to security objectives.There is only a loose understanding
that trade is one of the EU’s most important external instruments, and should thus
be involved in pursuing the ESS objectives.32 The ESS contains only one reference
to ‘conditionality and targeted trade measures’, suggesting a role for trade
sanctions. Yet, there is no explicit mentioning of either the position of trade
sanctions in the EU’s foreign and security policy framework, or of how and when
they should be applied. Equally, there is no reference to the EU’s bilateral trade
agreements (e.g., EPAs) or to its unilateral trade systems (e.g., GSP).33
The EU’s trade policy discourse, in turn, displays a number of references to
security objectives, but, equally, these are mostly rather imprecise. There is a
common assumption that pursuing free trade in a regulated way and through
multilateral institutions will contribute to security by addressing the underlying
causes of insecurity.Trade is not only about economic interests and exchanges, but
also about stability and welfare.As stated in the Global Europe strategy:
Progressive trade opening is an important source of productivity gains, growth and job
creation. It is an essential factor in reducing poverty and promoting development, with the
potential in the longer term to help address many of the underlying factors which drive
the global challenges we face, from security to migration to climate change.34
The strategy also contains a brief reference to the Kimberley Process on trade
restrictions for blood diamonds, stipulating that ‘unless justified for security or
environmental reasons, restrictions on access to resources should be removed’.35
28 European Council, supra n. 1, at 13, emphasis added.
29 Ibid., 10.
30 Ibid., 9 and 10.
31 European Council, supra n. 16, at 12.
32 European Council, supra n. 1; European Council, supra n. 16.
33 European Council, supra n. 1, at 10.
34 European Commission, supra n. 18, at 6.
35 Ibid., 7.
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However, there is no specification of the integration of the EU’s new instruments
and objectives in the realm of security, on the one hand, and the EU’s trade
instruments, on the other. Moreover, the document does not mention the EU’s
security strategy and the idea of human security, let alone elaborates on the
possible role of trade in the context of European security operations in the EU’s
neighbourhood or in Africa.36
References to the trade-security linkage are equally shallow in the ‘Trade,
Growth and World Affairs’ document, which presents the Commission’s latest
trade policy strategy. Still, unlike the ‘Global Europe’ document, the new trade
strategy dedicates an entire section to the link between trade and external
relations, which upholds that ‘the Union’s trade and foreign policies can and
should be mutually reinforcing’.37 This is clearly linked to the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty, which is the first EU Treaty to stipulate that the common
commercial policy ‘shall be conducted in the context of the principles and
objectives of the Union’s external action’.38 Nevertheless, there is little or no
elaboration in the strategy on how exactly the EU’s trade and security policies
could be used coherently, except from the concrete reference to the EU’s export
control system of dual-use goods. Explicitly stating that the export control system
‘serves a foreign policy-security goal’, the strategy announces that the Commission
‘will continue to develop export control measures aimed at simplifying and
making the business environment more transparent for EU exporters, which at the
same time contribute to strengthening international security efforts’.39
To conclude, while a cursory reading of the EU’s discourse uncovers apparent
parallels between its trade and security strategies and points to a vague intention to
pursue synergetic/benign coherence, the lack of strong cross-references suggests
that coherence between the two fields at the discursive level is mostly ‘neutral’. In
the next section, we move beyond the discursive level to explore and assess the
coherence between the actual activities of the trade and security policies. In
particular, we scrutinize the EU’s main trade activities of the last decade, at the
multilateral, bilateral and unilateral level.
36 Ibid.
37 European Commission, supra n. 19, at 15.
38 Art. 207(1)TFEU.
39 European Commission, supra n. 19, at 15.
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4 TRADE AS A SECURITY POLICY INSTRUMENT
4.1 THE MULTILATERAL LEVEL
The multilateral trade forum has always been a priority for the EU’s trade policy.
In the past fifteen years, the WTO negotiations have been by far the most
important forum for the EU’s trade policy machinery. However, while the EU has
promoted a broad agenda in the context of the Doha Development Round, the
EU’s WTO strategy is largely disconnected from its security objectives, not
considering the vague reference in the ESS to theWTO’s role in the EU’s pursuit
of effective multilateralism.40 Similarly, the WTO is not directly concerned with
security issues, and trade in arms has always been excluded from the GATT treaties
for reasons of national security.41 However, the EU has played a leading role in the
negotiations at the UN on an Arms Trade Treaty, which aims at establishing high
common standards for international trade in conventional arms.42
The link between Europe’s WTO agenda and its security policies is hazy at
best.The EU’s multilateral trade strategy is offensive with respect to liberalization
of the services industries and ‘Singapore issues’, and defensive on agriculture.
Substantive linkages with foreign and security policy are rather exceptional, such
as the linkage between Russia’s application for WTO membership and the
ratification of the Kyoto protocol.To be sure, security considerations can interfere
with EU trade policy objectives. For example, after 9/11, the EU and the US felt
the need to show the international community that they could and would still
work together to tackle international issues and problems. Introducing a new
WTO trade round seemed the perfect opportunity to prove to the world that
international cooperation and multilateralism was still possible and happening.
Accordingly, in November 2011, two months after the attack on theWTC towers,
the Doha round was launched.43
4.2 THE BILATERAL LEVEL
Bilateral trade arrangements – either in the form of FTAs,Trade and Cooperation
Agreements, or Association Agreements – provide more scope for the EU to
integrate foreign and security objectives into its trade activities than the
multilateral forum. Until recently, EU trade agreements with other countries were
40 European Council, supra n. 1.
41 GATT Article XXIb(ii).
42 S. Depauw, The European Union’s Involvement In Negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty, The EU
Non-Proliferation Consortium,NP paper 23 (2012).
43 D. Kleimann & J. Guinan, The Doha round: an obituary, Global Governance programme Policy Brief 1
(2011).
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preferential44 and sui generis, in line with broader foreign policy considerations.
Trade purists castigate such preferential arrangements, which are designed for
political purposes and hinder trade liberalization at the multilateral level. Messerlin
states that the EU attempted to ‘carve out zones of political influence through the
intensive use of discriminatory trade agreements’.45 He suggests that the EU was
so active in concluding preferential trade arrangements because it lacked a ‘real’
foreign policy.46
Since the 2000s, however, the EU’s external trade relations have become
more streamlined with economic rather than foreign policy objectives, both in
relation to: (i) the selection of trade partners (evolving from a focus on historical
and neighbouring partners to a worldwide approach) and (ii) the substantive
content (evolving from sui generis arrangements to WTO compatibility). This
move was formalized under the Commission’s ‘Global Europe’ strategy, which
called, inter alia, for a new generation of agreements – while reiterating the EU’s
commitment to the WTO negotiations process − with a number of emerging
economies where the EU has offensive economic interests, including ASEAN,
South Korea, and India. Looking at both the contents of the new bilateral
agreements and the selection of partner countries, it is clear that the EU’s new
agreements are less driven by foreign and security considerations than the previous
generation.47 First, economic interests, rather than foreign policy and security
considerations, have come to determine the selection of the new FTA partners. In
terms of horizontal coherence, for instance, there is no correlation between the
selected trade partners and the occurrence of operations in the framework of the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In a notable passage, the ‘Global
Europe’ document even openly states that previous trade arrangements were too
often based on the EU’s political concerns in developing countries and in the
neighbourhood, and that the EU wants to go back to its core business of
defending economic interests.48 Contrary to previous practices, the EU’s ‘main
trade interests’ need to be served better and ‘economic factors must play a primary
role’ in the choice of trading partners.
Second, also the content of the new agreements tends to be more
economy-oriented and less focused on political objectives. To begin with, unlike
the traditional preferential trade agreements, which were simply concerned with
removing tariff barriers for goods, the new FTAs encompass a whole range of
44 Preferential trading partners receive lower tariffs than the multilateral ‘most-favoured nation’ tariff
agreed in the GATT.
45 P.A.Messerlin,European commercial policy in the 2000s at 4 (Inst. Int’l Econ. 2001).
46 Peterson, supra n. 14, at 4.
47 Ibid.
48 European Commission, supra n. 18, at 9.
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trade-related issues in such areas as services, investment, competition, government
procurement, intellectual property rights and labour rights.The agreements appear
even less political in cases where the partner countries are heavily opposed to the
inclusion of provisions that are not trade-related. For instance, in the FTAs
currently being negotiated with India and ASEAN Member States, the
non-proliferation clause is likely to be dropped because it is not legally required
when the EU has also negotiated a PCA with the country concerned. India has
even stated that it does not want to include the (legally required) essential elements
clause in the FTA.49 In addition, India responded very heavily against a proposal
by the European Parliament to tie the FTA to the issue of Kashmir.
Even when political and security considerations are included, their impact
tends to be minor. An examination of EU bilateral trade agreements concludes
that these arrangements have a high level of ‘legal inflation’: they cover a wide
range of non-trade topics and are used for ‘declaratory diplomacy’, but the
provisions in question are not enforceable. EU trade agreements only contain
groundbreaking provisions in the area of competition policies – not in foreign
policy related issues.50 Moreover, as we will see in more detail below, when
violations of the ‘essential elements’ clauses effectively lead to ‘appropriate
measures’ (i.e., sanctions) by the EU, the latter are rarely trade-related. In sum, the
EU’s new bilateral trade agreements tend to be de-politicized compared to the
previous generation of bilateral trade agreements, with security objectives being
pushed to the backseat.
A distinct category within the EU’s arsenal of bilateral trade initiatives are the
negotiations of EPAs with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries. Following the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement (2000), both parties
undertook to negotiate reciprocal trade arrangements between 2002 and 2008.
More specifically, WTO compatible trade agreements between the EU and six
groups of ACP regions were to be established, constituting a watershed in
Europe’s relations with Africa.The scope and impact of these trade arrangements
will be even more extensive when the ‘interim EPAs’, are transformed into ‘full
EPAs’. Rather than traditional free trade agreements (FTAs), full EPAs – as
envisaged by the EU – encompass a whole range of trade-related issues in such
areas as services, investment, competition, government procurement, and
intellectual property rights.
49 F. Bossuyt, The social dimension of the New Generation of EU FTAs with Asia and Latin America, 14
European For.Affairs Rev. 5, 703−722 (2009).
50 H. Horn, P.C. Mavroidis & A. Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An autonomy of EU and US preferential trade
agreements, Breugel Blueprint SeriesVII (2009).
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Despite these broad ambitions, security objectives have been remarkably
absent in the EPA negotiations. This is a striking observation given that security
issues in Africa have been high on the EU agenda in the past decade. DGTrade has
negotiated EPAs with, among others, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan
and Zimbabwe, independently of the EU’s foreign and security policies towards
these countries.There are at least no indications that Europe’s diplomatic efforts in
resolving the conflicts in Eastern Congo and Darfur, and in defusing the political
situation in Zimbabwe interfered with the EPA negotiations, or that they involved
other trade instruments. Security considerations were not an issue on the
European trade agenda with Central or Southern Africa.The EU did not consider
the possibilities of granting additional trade incentives, or withdrawing existing
trade preferences based on the political and security situation in the ACP partners
countries. The European EPA agenda focused mainly on the establishment of
reciprocal free trade, trade-related rules, and development assistance under the
form of ‘Aid forTrade’.
Eventually, a number of ACP countries, including the DRC (as a member of
the Central Africa Group) and Sudan (as part of the Eastern and Southern Africa
Group), failed to negotiate EPAs by the end of 2007. As a result, their exports to
the European market are subject to the EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA)
initiative, which, as explained below, only deals with market access and does not
include any foreign policy elements. In turn, the EU has signed an EPA with
Zimbabwe and an interim EPA with Fiji, despite both countries being subject to
EU sanctions for the violation of the democratic principles. These trade
negotiations, which propose enhanced cooperation, are completely disconnected
from the EU’s concerns about the regimes in Zimbabwe and Fiji. Olsen’s analysis
of the ‘missing link’ between trade and security agendas in the context of EPAs
sheds light on why the EU initialled trade negotiations with Zimbabwe and Fiji,
despite its hostile foreign policy stance towards these countries.51 He argues that
security was not included as a separate issue because of the compartmentalization
of policy-making within the EU. Interviews with DG Trade officials (November
2009) revealed that DG Trade was indeed less enthusiastic about political
conditionality in EPAs compared with their colleagues at DG Development.
4.3 THE UNILATERAL LEVEL
The EU’s most commonly used unilateral trade instrument is the GSP, which is
legalized by the Enabling Clause within the framework of the GATT/WTO.The
51 G. R. Olsen, The missing link: EPAs, security and development interventions in Africa, in Faber & Orbie,
supra n. 7, 342−358.
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GSP scheme allows the EU to grant more favourable market access to developing
country imports, and thus to depart from the standard ‘most-favoured nations’
tariffs. The EU has pursued political objectives through the conditionality
incorporated in the GSP scheme: it provides additional market access to countries
complying with the EU’s foreign policy objectives (trade incentives), or it
withdraws trade preferences for countries violating these principles (trade
sanctions). The two main political objectives advanced through the GSP
mechanism are fighting drugs and promoting labour rights. For example, in the
1990s, Latin American countries actively fighting drug production and trafficking
were granted additional market access. In turn, market access for Moldova (2000)
and Sri Lanka (2004) was increased because the countries complied with the
fundamental labour standards as defined by the International Labour Organization
(ILO). In contrast, Burma’s GSP trade preferences were withdrawn (1997) because
of practices of forced labour, while Belarus lost its GSP market access (2007)
because of violations of freedom of association.52
However, the EU cannot apply social, drug, or any other kind of GSP
conditionality in a discretionary way. The use of a GSP ‘carrot and stick’ system
according to foreign policy considerations is confined by the WTO trade rules.
These legal constraints became clear when the EU added Pakistan to the drugs
incentive system in November 2001.The EU argued that Pakistan’s special GSP
preferences were related to its fight against drug production and trafficking, but in
fact the trade incentives were meant to support Pakistan’s role in the post 9/11
fight against terrorism. India challenged the European decision before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body. Briefly summarized, the WTO Appellate Body
concluded that additional GSP trade preferences must be related to development
objectives and must be based on clear criteria. They cannot simply be used to
reward countries for their contribution to European foreign and security policy
goals, e.g., in the fight against terrorism.53 This condemnation put an end to the
possibility of using preferential market access as a leverage for a country’s
cooperation in foreign and security issues.
In response to this WTO case, the EU revised its system of special GSP
preferences.The separate social and drugs clauses were abandoned and integrated
into a new ‘sustainable development and good governance’ regime.To be eligible
for ‘GSP-plus’ market access, requesting countries must be ‘vulnerable’ and ‘ratify
and effectively implement’ sixteen human rights conventions and several
conventions on environment and governance.This may be an example of how the
EU’s trade leverage is used to stimulate the ratification and implementation of
52 J. Orbie & L.Tortell, The New GSP+ Beneficiaries:Ticking the Box or Truly Consistent with ILO Findings?
14 European For.Affairs Rev. 5, 663–681 (2009).
53 L. Bartels,TheWTO legality of the EU’s GSP + arrangement, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 4, 869−886 (2007).
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multilateral conventions, in line with the Normative Power Europe role. For
example, the GSP-plus has been successful in ensuring the full ratification of the
eight fundamental labour standards in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia,
Venezuela, Mongolia and El Salvador. Actual implementation has been more
difficult to monitor, and led to inconsistencies in the application of labour standard
conditionality through trade. The European Commission’s new GSP proposal
provides a more serious and systematic monitoring.54
Remarkably, the EU was again repelled by the WTO over another initiative
involving Pakistan, when it decided in September 2010 to grant unilateral trade
concessions to Pakistan to support economic recovery after the devastating floods.
To ensure that its trade initiative would be in compliance with WTO law, the EU
requested a WTO waiver authorizing it to deviate from WTO rules to
discriminate in favour of Pakistan. However, the EU’s request for the waiver ran
into opposition at the WTO from a number of members, including India and
Bangladesh, whose consent was needed in order to secure the waiver. While
India’s opposition was politically motivated, Bangladesh feared for negative
implications on its textile industry. Moreover, the proposal to grant trade
concessions to Pakistan was not strongly supported by DG Trade.55 The waiver,
which allows for a temporary suspension of import duties on key Pakistani
imports, was eventually approved in early 2012 after the EU reduced the trade
concession in order to allay the opposition.56
In addition, the incentive system only applies to a limited number of
countries. First, the EU’s GSP regulation specifies that only vulnerable countries
can receive GSP-plus preferences. Therefore, many developing countries such as
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brazil, and Argentina are not eligible. Second, the
GSP-plus does not apply to the poorest countries, which already benefit from the
‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) scheme. In short, GSP-plus beneficiaries need to be
poor, but not too poor. Their number is limited to mostly the former drugs
beneficiaries in Latin America and some countries in the EU’s Eastern
neighbourhood.
The EBA system is another GSP incentive system reserved for the forty-nine
least-developed countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, the DRC,
Cambodia, and Haiti. Although the label of ‘Everything but Arms’ suggests a
54 F. Bossuyt, M. Martins Gistelinck, B. Kerremans, L.Tortell & J. Orbie, The Social Dimension of European
Union External Trade Relations, 14 European For.Affairs Rev. 5 (2009); European Commission, Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council applying a scheme of generalized tariff
preferences, COM (2011) 241, 2011/0117/COD.
55 As EU Trade Plan for Pakistan Hits Roadblock, Critics Ask: Was WTO Waiver Necessary? 15 Bridges
WeeklyTrade News Digest 12 (2011), http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/103513/.
56 Since the threshold for qualifying as a vulnerable country has been made more flexible, Pakistan may
well be eligible for the new GSP-plus.
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trade-security linkage, the continuation of tariffs for LDC arms and ammunitions
exports to the European market can hardly be considered a trade-security
initiative.
In sum, although the EU has used the GSP system for the pursuit of foreign
policy oriented objectives, the EU’s room for manoeuvre – and thus the degree of
horizontal coherence -, is restraint by the rules of theWTO.Moreover, the EU has
limited the scope of the revised trade incentive scheme by excluding the
least-developed and emerging (= non-vulnerable) developing countries. In
addition, there is no clear overlap between the priority regions of the European
security and defence policy and the GSP-plus beneficiaries, with the exception
perhaps of three countries in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood (Georgia since
2005;Armenia and Azerbaijan since 2009).
A final instrument that is scrutinized here is the use of sanctions against third
countries, which is probably the most obvious linkage between the EU’s
international activities under the (formerly) first and second pillars. This is even
more so considering that economic sanctions are so far the only foreign policy
measures to require both a joint action in the context of the CFSP and an EC
Council Regulation. However, here too, the relevance of trade sanctions based on
foreign and security considerations must be put into perspective. It is generally
acknowledged that the EU, and in particular, some Member States, has been
reluctant to apply sanctions, favouring the use of softer measures such as political
dialogue, trade and aid incentives.57 When the EU resorted to sanctions against
third countries, this has mostly been in relation to neighbouring countries or to
ACP countries, where most of the EU’s security and defence activities have taken
place.58
Importantly, even when the EU sanctions against third countries, there are
hardly any trade sanctions involved.59 The imposition of restrictive measures for
violations of the EU bilateral agreements’ ‘essential elements clause’ (see above),
for instance, has never included the use of trade sanctions. For example, eleven
countries have been sanctioned under Article 96 of the EU-ACP Cotonou
Agreement for violations of human rights and democratic principles.Various kinds
of sanctions were applied, ranging from very mild to rather severe measures, but no
trade measures. Similarly, the lengthy negotiations on EPAs have not considered
any linkage between EU-ACP trade flows and human rights considerations.60
57 C. Portela,European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy.When and Why do theyWork? (Routledge 2010).
58 C. Portela,When and where does the EU impose sanctions? 17 Politique Européenne 3, 83−111 (2005).
59 An exception are commodity embargoes: oil and gas embargoes, gems and semiprecious stones
embargoes, timber embargo, embargo on equipment for the gems processing industry, prohibition on
insurance, and a ban on investment and joint ventures. Such embargoes have been imposed on former
Yugoslavia,Myanmar, Iran and Syria.
60 K. Arts, A human rights-based approach to the ACP–EU EPAs, in Beyond Market Access for Development:
EU–Africa Relations inTransition 279–303 (G. Faber & J. Orbie eds., Routledge 2007).
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While general or specific trade sanctions have hardly been applied, notable
exceptions are Burma and Belarus, whose GSP trade preferences have been
withdrawn because of serious and systematic violations of fundamental labour
standards.These are proper ‘first pillar’ sanctions, and are part of a broader range of
foreign policy measures against Burma and Belarus, such as the suspension of
development aid, ban on entry visas, and freezing of assets. A more limited
application of pure trade sanctions has been the temporary withdrawal of Sri
Lanka’s GSP-plus preferences because of serious violations of Sri Lanka’s
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention against Torture (CAT) and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.61 In the most recent GSP regulation the EU pays more attention than
before to the possibility of such temporary withdrawals of trade preferences by
elaborating the procedures and extending the legal ground, which now also
includes ‘failure to comply with international conventions on anti-terrorism’ (Art
19(1c)).62 To what extent this elaborated linkage between trade preferences and
foreign policy objectives will be applied in practice remains to be seen. The
Commission has also proposed to reinstate tariff preferences for Myanmar given
the ongoing reforms in the country, thereby linking explicitly trade policy with
broader foreign policy considerations.63
Instead of trade sanctions, which limit specific or general trade flows to the
European market, the EU tends to use either ‘smart’ sanctions (travel sanctions,
financial sanctions) or the withdrawal of development aid and/or arms embargoes.
In fact, the latter link up with trade, since they effectively hinder the export of
arms. However, the relevance of the EU in this area is limited.When delegating
competence for commercial policies to the EU in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, it
was explicitly added that arms trade remained a national competence.Although an
Europeanization of the EU Member States’ regulations and practices in this area
has taken place in the past decade, inter alia, through the code of conduct on arms
trade, which became a Council Joint Action in 2008, and the regulation on
dual-use goods, this area is still largely a Member State competence.64
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in its 2011 Green Paper on the reform of the
export control system – as announced in the Commission’s latest trade strategy in
61 European Council, Implementing regulation EU No 143/2012, (15 Feb. 2010).
62 European Parliament and European Council, Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 applying a scheme of
generalized tariff preferences repealing Council regulation (EC) No 732/2008, (25 Oct. 2012).
63 European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council repealing
Council Regulation (EC) No 552/97 temporarily withdrawing access to generalized tariff preferences from
Myanmar/Burma, COM (2012) 524 final.
64 (2008/230/CFSP) (EC, No 428/2009); S. Bauer & E. Remacle, The EU’s policy in the field of arms
exports controls, in Rethinking EU foreign policy (B. Tonra & T. Christiansen eds., Manchester U. Press
2004).
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2010 (see above) – the Commission proposes a possible new EU export control
model based on a network of existing licensing authorities operating under more
common rules.65 While the Member States would maintain control of their export
control policies, overall, the goal would be to launch a genuinely common
approach to export controls across the entire EU (European Commission,
2011: 13).
5 CONCLUSION:ONLY ‘NEUTRAL’ COHERENCE
This article has explored the structural-operational interface in the EU’s
comprehensive approach to security, focusing in particular on the politico-strategic
level of the trade-security nexus. On the politico-strategic level, security
comprehensiveness is primarily a matter of horizontal coherence, i.e., coherence
between the different dimensions of the EU’s external action. If comprehensive
security is successfully implemented at the structural-operational interface, we
should find evidence of a positive synergetic interaction between the different
policy fields, which would be following the same agenda.The article started from
the assumption that we would find little evidence of this in the trade-security
nexus; indeed, we hypothesized that the challenge of comprehensive security to
combine structural activities with operational measures is most pronounced in the
trade-security nexus due to the strong institutional insulation of the EU trade
policy-making machinery.To examine this, we assessed the coherence between EU
trade and security discourses and the extent to which trade measures have been
used for security policy ends.
Based on our analysis of the main EU trade activities of the past decade, it is
clear that security objectives have been only scarcely integrated in trade policy, and
that overall, coherence between the trade and security realms is rather limited, or
‘neutral’ at best, to the extent that there is merely an absence of contradictions
instead of the establishment of a positive synergetic interaction. Nevertheless, there
are instances of ‘benign’ coherence, such as the EU’s GSP system and the revision
of the dual-use goods. However, also cases of ‘malign’ coherence were observed,
such as the EU initiating trade negotiations with Zimbabwe and Fiji, despite the
Union’s hostile foreign policy stance towards these countries.
Moreover, the empirical analysis mostly confirms the hypothesis that
horizontal coherence between the trade and security areas is inhibited by the
institutional compartmentalization and the lingering cross-pillar divide of the EU
system of external policy, in which DG Trade is a highly autonomous sub-system
65 European Commission, supra n. 19.
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that works according to its own logic and procedures. Indeed, the powerful
position that the EU’s trade policy machinery has acquired in the EU’s
institutional architecture allows it to act fairly independently and implies that its
activities cannot easily be influenced by other parts of the EU’s external relations
policy structure, including the CFSP. For example, while the EU’s security and
development strategies towards Africa have been geared to one another, in line
with the EU’s comprehensive approach to the security-development nexus, EU
trade policy-makers have clearly taken a different track. In line with Pilegaard’s
and Olsen’s analyses of the trade-aid and the trade-security nexus respectively, it is
clear that the trade and security sub-systems each operate according to their own
logic and standard procedures.66 Trade and security are based both on different
institutional logics in the Commission and the Council, and on different
ideological bases, reflecting the opposing views of trade purists and foreign policy
specialists. This refers to Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen’s argument that ‘the
tension lies in the (sometimes opposing) organizational esprit de corps of the
various institutional actors involved’.67 Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has not
changed this situation, as was shown by the most recent empirical examples in our
analysis.
However, the analysis also revealed that the internal-institutional aspect is in
itself not enough to explain the limited horizontal coherence in the trade-security
nexus, and thus the difficulty of combining structural measures with operational
activities in the pursuit of comprehensive security. In particular, we found that the
inhibiting impact of the internal-institutional setting of the EU is reinforced by
two external factors, notably by legal restraints imposed by the international trade
regime and by the resistance of important trade partners to incorporate non-trade
issues in trade arrangements.
To begin with, the strong rules-bound character of the international trade
regime works against EU attempts at using trade for foreign policy and security
purposes. As demonstrated above, the EU experienced this when its special trade
preferences to Pakistan were condemned by theWTO. It is thus not a coincidence
that the EU’s trade policy – its unilateral (GSP) and bilateral trade relations – has
become increasingly de-politicized, streamlined with the economic orthodoxy as
enshrined in theWTO Agreements. Since the end of the 1990s, compatibility with
the WTO has been the leitmotiv in EU bilateral trade negotiations. This means
that, in accordance with GATT Article XXIV, reciprocal liberalization between
both trading partners should be established. As a result, there is less scope for sui
66 Pilegaard, supra n. 8; Olsen, supra n. 30; Peterson, supra n. 14.
67 Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, supra n. 2.
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generis, preferential arrangements à la Lomé or the first generation of Euro-Med
agreements designed in the 1960s and 1970s.
That said, the EU’s strong support for the WTO regime is also linked to the
fact that, as the world’s most powerful trading bloc, the EU has strong interests in a
stable and global trading system. From this perspective, it does not come as a
surprise that the EU’s current trade policy is driven predominantly by economic
interests. Notwithstanding the EU’s rather normative and broad definition of what
constitute its trade interests, its basic mandate still resolves around the promotion
of the EU’s offensive economic sectors and the protection of sensitive European
industries.The integration of foreign and security objectives into the trade realm,
for instance, by granting additional market access or sanctioning trade with a
particular country, may hurt particular economic actors inside the EU.
Manipulating trade preferences according to foreign policy considerations would
not only violateWTO rules, but would also affect some vested economic interests
negatively and jeopardize the stability of the economic system.This point is clearly
linked to the ideational factor of the trade-security linkage and the corresponding
debate held among academics and policy-makers alike about the purpose of trade
policy, which reflects the basic tension that exists between the views of trade
purists (including trade policy-makers) and foreign policy specialists (including
diplomats).
A second factor that works against the EU’s use of trade instruments for
security purposes is the resistance of important trade partners against the
incorporation of non-trade issues in trade agreements. This is based on a
legitimized fear that non-economic arrangements will be employed for
geopolitical or commercial reasons, combined with reluctance towards political
interference of Western powers into their domestic system.This partly explains the
limited number of applications for the GSP-plus conditionality system. The
clearest example is probably India’s resistance to incorporate in the FTA the – for
the EU standard – essential elements clause, and in fact any clause that is not
trade-related. In this context it should be noted that, also at the non-EU side of
the negotiation table, diplomats and politicians usually belong to the trade or
finance ministries and not to the foreign and security policy unit of their political
system.
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